Social Rootedness: Examining Ethnic and National Attachments in Ghana by Asante, Kofi Takyi
 1 
SOCIAL ROOTEDNESS: EXAMINING ETHNIC AND 
NATIONAL ATTACHMENTS IN GHANA 
 
Kofi Takyi Asante 




The question of national unity has exercised the minds of researchers and politicians 
since the dawn of independence. But since the wave of democratisation in the late 
1980s, ethnicity again has come under the spotlight as electoral competition 
highlighted the problem of divisive politics across the democratising world. In this 
study, I pose the question: what is the impact of alternative group loyalties on national 
attachment? Using a survey of 996 university students, I find evidence supporting 
recent reports of declining salience of ethnicity in Ghana. However, the effect of 
ethnicity on national attachment was counterintuitive. Conceptually, individualistic 
orientations undermined national attachment, while collectivistic orientations boosted 
it. I argue that rather than being contradictory impulses, ethnicity and national 
attachment are both underlaid by the same collectivistic orientation, pointing to the 
importance of social rootedness. I deploy qualitative and historical data to give 
substance and texture to these findings.  
 
 








Nothing in Nigeria’s political history captures her problem of national integration 
more graphically than the chequered fortune of the word tribe in her vocabulary. 
Tribe has been accepted at one time as a friend, rejected as an enemy at another, and 
finally smuggled in through the back-door as an accomplice. 
(Chinua Achebe, The Trouble With Nigeria, 5) 
  
INTRODUCTION 
The question of national unity has exercised the minds of researchers since national 
independence appeared on political horizons across Africa. Modernisation theorists in the 
1950s and 1960s proposed an evolutionary model of development in which newly 
independent nations would follow the paths beaten by European states. As the dreams of 
political and economic development turned to nightmare in the 1970s, another set of scholars 
turned to accounts of historical exploitation to explain the continuing salience of ethnicity. 
Since the so-called third wave of democratization in the late 1980s, ethnicity has again come 
under the spotlight as electoral competition created divisive politics across the democratising 
world. 
 Ethnicity, or its impolite synonym tribalism, is an elusive concept. It was used among 
early anthropologists ‘as a heuristic category… with only intuitive meanings attached to it,’ 
but later attempts at a more concrete definition proved to be ‘not enlightening’ (Ekeh 1975, 
662). As used in the literature, ethnicity refers to feelings of attachment to an ‘imagined 
community’ at the subnational level, a community often defined in terms of common 
language, history, culture, or political systems (for a review of this large body of works, see 
Lentz 1995). Ethnicity may or may not come with discriminatory attitudes towards outsiders. 
John Lonsdale (1994) argues that the most contentious issues relating to ethnicity has to do 
with struggles over what it means to be a good member of particular ethnic communities.  
This paper is a first stab at a much broader project aimed at theorising citizenship in 
Ghana. For such an endeavour, perhaps the most apposite starting point is ethnicity, because 
ethnicity is widely understood to be the mortal enemy of a true civic orientation. My purpose 
in this paper is simple; I seek to measure the strength of national attachment in Ghana, and the 
effect of ethnicity on this attachment. To do this, I frame the problem more generally, asking: 
what is the impact of alternative group loyalties on national attachment? To answer this 
question, I select five forms of identifications whose salience can be theorised as directly in 
competition with the state for the loyalties of citizens.  
I deploy qualitative and historical data to give substance and texture to the statistical 
findings. In particular, I emphasise the importance of a historical perspective on citizenship 
and identification. This is important because a key weakness of scholarship on national 
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belonging in Africa has been the ‘tend[ency] to foreshorten historical time and to privilege the 
present at the expense of the past’ (Hunter 2016b, 1). Examining the ways in which ‘basic 
assumptions about moral rights and obligations’ (Owusu 1989, 373; Lonsdale 1994) are 
embedded in local cultures helps to understand the ways in which national belonging is 
imagined and performed.  
In what follows, I review the literature on ethnicity, focusing specifically on its 
theorised relationship with national identification. I then turn to the main empirical data, a 
survey of university students conducted in March and April 2017 in Ghana. Results from 
descriptive analysis support recent findings about the declining salience of ethnicity in Ghana. 
However, the effect of ethnicity on national attachment is counterintuitive. Conceptually, I 
find that individualistic orientations undermined national attachment, while collectivistic 
orientations boosted it. Thereafter, I use qualitative and archival data to expatiate on the 
statistical results, and evaluate prevailing theories of ethnic and national identification.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: ETHNICITY AND THE NATION STATE IN 
AFRICA  
At independence, African leaders felt the heavy weight of the responsibilities they were 
inheriting from departing colonial administrators. Radical economic transformation was 
necessary to ‘catch up’ with the West. But they feared that their state-building agenda risked 
being jeopardised by the persistence of strong subnational attachments. There was the need to 
transform their people from parochial ‘tribesmen’ to cosmopolitan citizens, to enlarge their 
vistas to accommodate the diversity of peoples who now composed these new nations. At the 
All-African Peoples Conference held on 5-13 December 1958 in Accra, it was declared that 
‘tribalism’ was an ‘obstacle’ in the way of ‘the unity… the political evolution… (and) the 
rapid liberation of Africa’ (quoted in Sklar 1960, 493). 
This anxiety was also shared by scholars. The literature can be broadly classified into 
modernisation (classic and 2nd generation) and colonial legacy explanations (Eifert, Miguel, 
and Posner 2010; Robinson 2014). Modernisation theorists argued that with economic and 
social development, narrow ethnic sentiments would eventually wither away, while their 
dependency theory-style counterparts attributed the intensity of subnational allegiances to the 
legacies of colonialism.  
Modernisation theory was developed from structural functionalism. Drawing on the 
works of European theorists like Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies, structural 
functionalism was a theoretical behemoth totalistic in its reach. In The Division of Labour in 
 4 
Society, Durkheim (1893) proposes a theory of social change from simple, small-scale 
societies based on mechanical solidarity – bonds of attachment arising from shared norms – to 
more complex societies held together by organic solidary – social bonds based on 
interdependence. Whereas mechanical solidarity was essentially an automatic emotional 
response, organic solidarity was reasoned and deliberate. Tönnies labels the two ends of this 
evolutionary continuum Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellshaft (society). Using 
contradictory terminology but espousing the same logic, Tönnies (1955, 74) argues that 
Gemeinschaft relationships are those that organically sprang out of ties of blood and land. On 
the other hand, the Gesellschaft represents an ‘artificial construction,’ a ‘superficial’ entity 
and one held together by the sole medium of instrumental calculation. He, therefore, argues 
that ‘[a]ccordingly, Gemeinschaft (community) should be understood as a living organism, 
Gesellschaft (society) as a mechanical aggregate and artefact’ (Tönnies 1955, 39).  
Talcott Parsons, the formidable structural functionalist, details out the conceptual 
distinctions between traditional and modern societies in an elaborate theoretical framework. 
These he summarised in the famous pattern variables, a set of five dichotomous variables 
‘focused on the relational aspect of the role structure of the social system’ (Parsons 1991, 43 
[1951]). The binary oppositions of the pattern variables projected an image of traditional 
societies as parochial in contrast to the cosmopolitanism of modern societies. Modernisation 
was going to deliver traditional peoples from the shackles of their own irrational affections 
and prejudices. Parsons (1991, 137) argued that traditional societies are characterised by a 
collectivistic outlook, modern societies by an individualistic one. 
In the meantime, urban sociologists, especially in the Chicago School, were using the 
city as a laboratory to test out the ideas of the classical thinkers. Titles like ‘Urbanism as a 
Way of Life’ provided empirically rich descriptions of the theorised effects of modernisation 
on the individual. However, contrary to Durkheimian optimism, many early students of the 
city noticed a lack of community, resulting in debilitating effects on social and political 
participation (Zorbaugh 1983 [1929]). There was growing bifurcation in cities along lines of 
class, ethnicity, and lifestyle. Du Bois was one of the earliest scholars to recognise the 
devastating consequences that residential segregation, along racial lines, could engender (Du 
Bois and Eaton 1899). Contrary to earlier assumptions that affectivity would give way to 
rationalism in urban areas, Du Bois’ studies proves that some of those sentiments were 
actually intensified, sometimes perversely so. Studies at the turn of the twentieth century 
illustrated the resilience of primordial attachments with the failure of races to mix in most 
urban centres of America, resulting in what Massey and Denton (1993) call an American 
 5 
Apartheid. The promised affective neutrality and universalism proclaimed by Parsons in the 
pattern variables had failed to be realised in the quintessential Gessellschaft. 
Nevertheless, modernisation theorists, clutching to insights from structural 
functionalism and wielding the faith that moves mountains of contradictory evidence, 
ventured into newly independent countries with prescriptions for welding together into 
unified states their motley collections of ethnic groups. What these countries needed to do 
was to lose their traditional orientations and they would be on the highway to development. 
Rostow (1959, 7), for instance, believes that the development of a national spirit was an 
important part of the precondition for take-off stage, since ‘a definitive political 
transformation’ can ‘[harness these] national energies, talents, and resources around the 
concrete tasks of economic growth’. 
These scholars believed that with economic development, ethnic sentiments would 
fizzle out. Urbanisation, industrialisation, and the widening of wage employment were going 
to be crucial elements in this process. Wage employment would reduce reliance on ethnic 
networks for access to agricultural land. This, together with industrialisation, would pull 
villagers into towns and cities, forcing them to interact with people of all ethnicities. This 
would lead to greater tolerance and the development of a national orientation (Robinson 
2014). Moreover, investment in massive developmental projects by the state would call forth 
from within the hearts of the citizenry affection and loyalty. For their part, nationalist 
politicians also embarked on deliberate campaigns and projects to generate feelings of 
attachment to the state. Some scholars pointed out that these processes were yielding mixed 
results. For instance, Cohen (1969) found that in some instances, urbanisation weakened 
ethnic attachments while in others, ethnic sentiments were intensified; processes he referred 
respectively to as detribalisation and retribalisation. Sometimes, there was even the 
phenomenon of supertribalisation, where related ethnic groups combined in urban settings to 
form umbrella associations (Rouch 1956).  
Not all scholars of ethnicity in Africa were worried, though. Richard Sklar’s 
provocatively titled paper, ‘The Contribution of Tribalism to Nationalism in Western 
Nigeria,’ is an example. He argues that without the pantribalism which gave ‘impetus to the 
growth of mass political parties…[t]he British Government would not, in principle, have 
transferred power’ to the leaders of the nationalist struggle (Sklar 1960, 493, 502). Immanuel 
Wallerstein (1960) also argues that ethnic mobilisation was a necessary step towards the 
ultimate destination of exclusive national attachment. Invoking Parsons’ pattern variables, he 
argues that tribalisation was a positive development because it reduced the salience of familial 
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ties, which he considered more damaging to national attachment than ethnicity. Echoing 
Robert Banfield’s (1958) then prevailing notion of ‘amoral familism,’ he argues that family 
attachments compels one to focus on a very narrow sphere of life, whereas ethnic allegiances 
orient the affections towards a much larger, more diffuse, more abstract social sphere, 
ultimately embracing the entire nation.1 From this standpoint, ethnic politics was never a 
threat, because it mobilised individuals to participate in national life.  
After decades of political and economic stagnation in Africa, including divisive 
political crisis and ethnically-linked violence, most scholars could not afford Sklar and 
Wallerstein’s optimism. Nevertheless, a group of scholars, exhibiting admirable theoretical 
fidelity, decided it was time to revise rather than reject modernisation theory. These scholars, 
nicknamed ‘second-generation modernisation’ theorists by Eifert et al (2010), advocated an 
instrumentalist conception of ethnicity. They no longer saw the disappearance of ethnic 
identification as an inevitable consequence of development. Instead, they argued that rather 
than dampen ethnic sentiments, the politics of development could actually make these 
subnational identifications more salient, as communities and groups struggled to control 
access to state resources.  
Colonial legacy explanations, on the other hand, lay the blame on colonialism. 
Arbitrary colonial boundaries are said to have laid the foundation for intractable interethnic 
tensions by cobbling together diverse and sometimes antagonistic ethnic groups, resulting in 
suspicion and tensions in the new states (Young 1979). Furthermore, they claim that the 
cynical manipulation of ethnic identities by colonial administrators, in their quest to entrench 
colonial power, exacerbated ethnic tensions. This argument draws on the famous ‘invention of 
tradition’ thesis. In their attempts to bolster the authority of traditional leaders with whom 
they collaborated, colonial regimes sought to clearly define customs and identities, in the 
process freezing identities which had been marked by fluidity in the past. This was reinforced 
by nationalist politicians in the ensuing power struggles at the dawn of independence (Ekeh 
1975).  
The quantitative literature on ethnicity has not taken advantage of advances made in 
the study of ethnicity since The Invention of Tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012 [1983]). 
Scholars in history and anthropology have moved beyond top-down notions of ‘invention’ to 
argue that transformation in ethnic identities was an endeavour which could not have been 
dominated by colonial officials. Colonial initiatives were challenged or abetted by different 
                                                     
1 Wallerstein did not directly quote Banfield. 
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actors in colonial societies, as they struggled to secure their perceived interests (Berry 1992; 
Lentz 1995; Spear 2003). Ranger, the author of the Africa chapter in The Invention, has since 
recanted his position, and has suggested that scholars should shift from a focus on ‘invention’ 
to one of ‘imagination’, in acknowledgement of the realisation that official colonial attempts 
were simply one out of many endeavours to remake ethnic identities; and that, in contrast to 
‘invention,’ imagination acknowledges the contingencies that characterised outcomes of 
official attempts (Ranger 1993). 
Scholars have also moved beyond a static view of identities. Instead, they see them as 
constantly shifting principles by which people relate to one another, and which are perpetually 
adjusted in response to given situations. In the Gold Coast, although plans by colonial 
officials to imprint fixity and stability on mercurial social conditions ‘could nowhere be 
translated into practice,’ local chiefs tried to ‘appropriate’ these official colonial idioms in a 
bid to entrench their own power (Lentz 2000, 116–17). The shifting meanings of ethnicity 
have continued into the postcolonial period. In her study on politics and ethnicity in Ghana, 
Naomi Chazan (1982) observes that in practice,  ethnicity could mean anything from language 
groups, to communities, to administrative regions, depending on the matter at hand.  
These insights have not been incorporated into most quantitative studies on ethnicity 
in Africa. Even when not drawing on an crudely essentialist or primordial conception of 
ethnicity, these studies have largely proceeded on the assumption that ethnicity is a category 
that has objective stability and can be accurately measured (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 
2013; Miguel 2004; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Nunn 2008). It is necessary to guard against 
the assumption of stability or even objective existence of these identities, and to instead 
investigate how actors think about themselves in relation to these identities.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To examine the impact of ethnicity on national identification, I ask a more general question: 
what is the impact of potentially competing group identifications on national attachment? In 
addition to ethnicity, I include religion. Mustapha (1986) points out that religion can, under 
certain circumstances, be an equally salient mode of attachment. Under colonial rule, religion 
became an instrument of protest. In West Africa, churches were Africanised and the 
theologies of sects like the Jehovah’s Witnesses, were appropriated into potent weapons of 
colonial resistance (Hodgkin 1956). I also include professional identities; if modernisation 
theory is correct, we should expect greater salience of professional identities to result in 
 8 
greater national attachment. Pan-African identity, while not a subnational attachment, could 
potentially detract from the loyalty which citizens would otherwise offer the state. There are 
some overlaps between the selected forms of identifications and other measures in the 
literature, like Eifert and colleagues’ (2010, 497).2 
Since the dynamics between these forms of allegiance and national identification are 
seen as a zero-sum game, I propose the following hypothesis: Greater levels of attachment to 
non-state identities would result in lower levels of attachment to the state. Secondly, we can 
expect from the Durkheimian assumptions underlying modernisation theory, that greater 
attachment to a professional identity would result in greater national attachment. 
 This paper is mainly based on data from a survey administered to 996 students at the 
University of Ghana and Ghana Institute of the Management and Professional Administration 
between March and April 2017. Questionnaires were administered to students at both 
undergraduate and graduate levels. This is admittedly unrepresentative. Nevertheless, the 
views of students are important, because they are the section of the population whose daily 
rounds of activities, give them the greatest exposure to the legitimating ideologies of the state. 
In addition, they constitute ‘the political and economic elite’ in its embryonic form, which 
‘makes their ideas on citizenship especially relevant’ (Godefroidt, Langer, and Meuleman 
2016, 7–8). Since this survey is not nationally representative, I use data from the Wave 6 of 
the nationally representative Afrobarometer survey (2015), a dataset of 2400 respondents, to 
get a sense of how closely attitudes of my sample respondents approach national averages. I 
further contextualise the quantitative findings using qualitative data from ongoing interviews, 
and I historicise them by using archival materials and the rich historical and anthropological 
stock of knowledge on mutations of ethnic identities. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is national attachment. I define this as the sum of citizens’ emotional 
responses towards the state. National attachment is an amalgam of different sentiments. To 
measure this concept, the questionnaire included a battery of questions regarding; 1) sense of 
belonging, 2) national pride, 3) sense of having a personal stake in the country, 4) willingness 
to die for the country, and 5) a self-rated sense of patriotism. Respondents were presented 
with a set of statements (see Figure 1 below) and asked to indicate the extent of their 
agreement on a Likert scale with values ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly 
                                                     
2 Their list of salient identities includes ethnic, religion, class/occupation, gender, and a miscellaneous category 
labelled “other.”’ 
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disagree), with 3 as a neutral midpoint. To make for intuitive interpretation I reverse-coded 
the Likert items.  
Feelings of national pride and national belonging were high among the sampled 
students (4.38 and 4.30 respectively, out of a maximum of 5). Self-professed sense of 
patriotism and a sense of having a personal stake in the country were only slightly lower (4.1 
and 3.9 respectively). In spite of this clear sense of national loyalty, respondents balked at the 
idea of sacrificing their lives for the country. Figure 1 shows that ‘dying for the country,’ falls 
below the mid-point line indicating a small degree of disagreement with the statement. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
Most studies attempting to measure national attachment use the Linz-Moreno 
question. This question asks respondents to place themselves on an identification scale that 
ranges from ‘solely ethnic’ to ‘solely national,’ with a midpoint indicating equal ‘ethnic and 
national identification.’ Exclusive use of the Linz-Moreno question to measure the relative 
salience of ethnic or national attachment makes it impossible to independently measure the 
salience of each of these identifications (Guinjoan and Rodon 2015). I address this weakness 
by generating a new measure of national attachment. To do this, I combine the individual 
national sentiment questions into a composite variable as a measure of national attachment 
(Cronbach’s alpha, 0.79). I give twice more weight to willingness to sacrifice and a sense of 
having a stake in the country, because these two items indicate a more intense, and possibly 
action-oriented component, of national sentiment than the three other more notional 
components.  
Independent variables 
Due to the design of the survey, education was naturally controlled for. The ages of 
respondents range from 17 to 64 years, with a mean of 21.6 years. The other demographic 
variables are summarised in Table 1 below. Females made up just over 51% of the sample. 
Because of the youthfulness of the sample, most were single. In terms of partisan distribution, 
the governing New Patriotic Party (NPP) enjoys 43.4% support among students, with the 
main opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) commanding only 11.6%. The support 
of the smaller parties combined is negligible, a reflection of the de facto two-party character 
of Ghanaian electoral politics. The share of support of the two main parties in the sample also 
reflects recent national trends. In the 2016 general elections, the NPP swept the votes in all 
university campuses in the country.  
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[Table 1 here] 
 
The main independent variables measure the relative salience of the selected 
identities: religion, ethnicity, profession/education, family, and Pan-African identity. The 
preamble to this set of questions closely follows the wording of the Moreno question in the 
Afrobarometer survey. The questionnaire presented respondents with a hypothetical choice 
scenario and asked: Would you consider any of the options below more important than being 
Ghanaian? Responses ranged from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, with a ‘neutral’ 
middle category. I also asked questions measuring participation in civic life (voting, voluntary 
group membership, and protesting) as control variables.  
 Figure 2 below graphically represents the mean scores of the variables (identification 
variables are the first five bars on the right). Family attachment is the most salient (4.34), 
whereas the ethnic group has the least salience relative to national identification. In fact, the 
ethnic score of 2.97 is evidence of a tiny mean disinclination among the students to choose 
ethnic over national identity. All other forms of identification – religion, studies/profession, 
pan-African – are above the neutral midpoint line. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The low salience of ethnic scores is consistent with findings from the nationally 
representative Afrobarometer survey (see Figure 3 below). Eleven percent of all respondents 
in that survey chose a predominantly ethnic attachment in response to the survey’s Moreno 
question. The comparable figure for tertiary students in that sample was almost 8%. In 
another study of Ghanaian university students, Godefroidt et al (2016) found a similar pattern 
of responses to their Moreno question. They also found what to them was a puzzling 
observation, that Ghanaian students’ conception of citizenship was a combination of both 
ethnic and civic elements. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The other independent variables in my survey data are measures of participation in 
national life. Voting is the most popular form of civic engagement, but national level elections 
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(3.9) far outweighed local level elections (2.96) in importance. Participation in local level 
elections actually shows a slight disinclination. The trend of disinclination was much more 
obvious in all the other measures of participation. Demonstrations and protests are the most 
unpopular civic acts among my respondents, even though universities are generally hotbeds of 
unrests and protests (Balsvik 1998).  
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
The Afrobarometer survey shows a similar trend of participation across different 
spheres of civic action. As shown in Figure 4 above, electoral participation remains by far the 
most popular civic act. Other forms of civic engagement, associational life and contact with 
leaders remain low. Participation in direct forms of civic protest among Afrobarometer 
respondents remain as low as it was with my student sample. 
 
FINDINGS 
For the analysis, I created dummy variables for the five identification questions. ‘Agree’ and 
‘strongly agree’ were coded 1 (‘Yes’), and remaining response categories were coded 0 
(‘No’).  I also created dummies for sex (with ‘Male’ as reference category) and party 
affiliation (NDC, NPP, and Neutral). Figure 5 graphically represents the results of the OLS 
regression prediction of the strength of national attachment as a function of other forms of 
identification. Model 1 includes only the estimated effects of the main independent variables. 
Religion, African, and ethnic identities have positive effects, while the effects of 
studies/profession and family are negative. All of these effects are significant at the 0.01 alpha 
level, with the exception of ‘Africa’ and ‘Religion,’ which are significant at the 0.05 level. 
This finding rejects the modernisation theory-inspired hypothesis that leads us to predict an 
inverse relationship between ethnicity and national attachment. It also rejects another 
modernisation theory hypothesis that a positive relationship should exist between professional 
identification and national attachment. 
 
 [Figure 5 here] 
 
Although the Afrobarometer survey does not contain a directly comparable question, 
we can infer from other questions, if not confirmation, at least some confidence that the 
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causal direction of ethnicity here is not due to random error. To gauge tolerance, 
Afrobarometer respondents are asked to answer a battery of question about attitudes towards 
having certain social groups as neighbours. Only 4.1% of national respondents expressed 
discomfort at having non-ethnic neighbours. As can be seen from Figure 6 below, more 
university students (11.3%) actually expressed aversion for members of other ethnic groups. 
Moreover, these attitudes appear to be independent of the strength of ethnic attachment. The 
second chart in Figure 6 compares respondents whose identities were mainly ethnic (see Fig 3 
above) and the full Afrobarometer sample. In both groups, tolerance for non-ethnics was 
overwhelming, at more than 90%.  
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
After adding demographic controls to my regression model, the effect sizes do not 
change much. There is a small increase in the effect of religion and slight decreases in the 
effects for familial, African, and ethnic identities. However, the effect sizes and direction of 
these demographic variables are interesting in their own right. Being single results in a large 
decrease in national attachment, and partisan neutrality, rather than partisanship, negatively 
affects national attachment. However, none of these demographic variables was significant. 
The full model includes the variables for civic participation. All have positive effects except 
participation in public protest, which is also significant. Including participation controls only 
slighty reduces the impact of the identification variables. 
On examination would render these findings less surprising. Levstik and Groth (2005) 
found in a study of high school students in Ghana, that ethnic salience was not incompatible 
with intense expressions of nationalism. Among the students in their study, ethnic histories 
fed into, rather than detracted from national histories. They argue that this attitude was 
important in fostering tolerance for ethnic diversity among these students. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by respondents in ongoing qualitative interviews I 
am conducting as part of this project.3 My respondents repeatedly made reference to the 
colonial origins of the country, a fact which made them keenly alive to the responsibility that 
‘we’ve got to find a way to life together.’ Thus, in their definitions of Ghanaianness, their first 
                                                     
3 This qualitative component of the study is being conducted using a theoretical sampling method which is 
marked by an iterative approach to data collection and analysis. The process commenced in a two-fold process: 
1) follow-up interviews with participants in the survey, and 2) interviews with prominent or influential public 
personalities, such as journalists. As the study progresses, further data collection will be informed by emerging 
insights from the initial set of data being collected. Thus far, about twelve interviews have been conducted. 
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impulse was to resort to the legal stipulations: possession of Ghanaian passports, birth 
certificates, and the like. A musician, Odo Nkoaa,4 said that the essence of Ghanaianness ‘is 
just a piece of paper left by the British.’ When they referred to cultural ingredients of the 
Ghanaian identity, this reference was always vague. It was only upon further probing that they 
mentioned specific cultural norms and practices, such as peculiarities of speech or greetings, 
themselves not exclusively Ghanaian traits.  
Like the respondents in Levstik and Groth’s study, my respondents tended to see no 
contradiction between a strong ethnic and national identification. They warned about the 
dangers of sliding into bigotry and assuming airs of superiority, but in itself, they found 
nothing wrong with celebrating one’s ethnicity. Indeed, journalist Naa Oyo confessed that a 
sense of ethnic belonging came more naturally to her than national identification. As she said, 
‘I don’t struggle with what it means to be Asante. There’s a certain connection there that I 
don’t feel with being Ghanaian.’ This largely arose from her sense of the failures of the 
Ghanaian state to, as she so poetically put it, make her ‘feel like a beloved.’ This sentiment 
mirrors some scholarship of the Ghanaian state. The Ghanaian state has been described as ‘a 
pain disseminating rather than a welfare state’; as a reluctant or inefficient distributor of 
welfare benefits, but a generous dispenser of pain (Anyimadu 2006, 5). Jonathan Frimpong-
Ansah (1991) has given Ghana the bloodcurdling soubriquet, Vampire State. 
Individualistic and Collectivistic Orientations 
The regression results seem to map onto an underlying pattern. The variables which presented 
negative effects (career, family, singlehood, and partisan neutrality) are variables that point to 
an underlying individualistic orientation. On the other hand (religion, Pan-African identity, 
ethnicity, and partisanship) all point towards a collectivistic orientation. Recognising the 
underlying pattern removes the surprise that might have been occasioned by the positive 
effect of ethnicity.5 
The most telling evidence comes from the predicted values for marital status and 
political affiliation (Figure 7). As we should expect from the direction of the regression 
results, marriage and widowhood yield positive predictions. Divorce generates an even 
greater negative effect than singlehood. This again is confirmation of the inference that it is 
individualistic orientation that is driving the effects; for divorce is evidence of a strong self-
                                                     
4 The respondents’ names used in this paper are all pseudonyms. 
5 However, since the effects of partisanship are not statistically significant, we cannot say much about its effect 
beyond the observation that they provide a straw-in-the-wind proof for the individualistic-collectivistic pattern 
which I discern in the data. 
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assertive spirit, especially in a social context where marriage is so highly valued. We find a 
similar pattern for partisan affiliation. The predicted probabilities for the ruling and all the 
important opposition parties are also positive, even though there is reason to assume that 
membership in an opposition party could weaken national attachment. It is actually partisan 
neutrality which yields a negative prediction. This evidence is important because non-
partisanship is often touted as evidence of closer identification with the nation-state, and is 
accorded greater normative value than the supposed divisiveness of partisanship.6 
 
[Figure 7 here] 
 
My in-depth interviews provide further qualitative evidence for the inferred 
underlying pattern. Respondents repeatedly mentioned ethnic belonging as an important 
component of their senses of national identity. Naa Oyo, who reports a high salience of her 
ethnic identification, claims, nevertheless, to hold both national and ethnic identifications 
harmoniously: ‘I can be both Asante and Ghanaian.’ Much of her notions of belonging came 
from her father, whom she describes as being ‘pro-Ghana, pro-CPP, pro-Asante.’7 It is telling 
that all three identifications – country, political party, ethnic group – fall on the collectivistic 
end of the orientation scale. He inculcated in her the importance of all these forms of 
belonging because, she said, ‘society mattered to him.’ It is clear here, as I have also shown in 
the analysis of the statistical results, that the collectivistic orientation which underpins ethnic 
identification, is what also underpins attachment to the state. The expectation of 
modernisation theorists that nationalistic identities would supplant ethnic loyalties, is 
contradicted by this data. Even more importantly, my study shows that both forms of 
identifications are underlaid by the same collectivistic orientation. 
 
SOCIAL ROOTEDNESS8: TOWARDS A THEORY OF ETHNICITY AND 
NATIONAL ATTACHMENT 
In spite of their other differences, modernisation and colonial legacy theories agree on the 
perverse effects of ethnicity on national attachment. Both versions of modernisation theory 
conceive of the relationship between ethnic and national identifications as a zero-sum game. 
                                                     
6 The Ghana Freedom Party and the Great Consolidated People’s Party are insignificant parties with comical 
leaders, and we can assume that support for these parties indicates a dismissive attitude towards the state. 
7 CPP, the Convention People’s Party, is the party of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president. 
8 I am grateful to Kofi Blankson Ocansey for this phrase. 
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Even Sklar and Wallerstein view ethnicity as simply help-along-the-way, a catalyst which 
will self-obliterate after performing its good works. They assume that with the transition from 
tradition to modernity, ethnic identification would atrophy. It was that misunderstanding that 
led Godefroidt and colleagues (2016), finding that Ghanaian students had both ethnic and 
civic conceptions of citizenship, to describe these conceptions as ‘postmodern.’ I will argue 
below that there is nothing postmodern about it; and, further, that this phenomenon is not 
even new.  
Durkheim’s theory of the relationship between mechanical and organic solidarity has 
been hugely influential with modernisation scholars in spite of the fact that in The Division of 
Labour, there appears to be a lack of clarity about the actual nature of these solidarities. On 
the one hand, Durkheim argues that solidarity based on interdependence and self-interest, was 
going to totally supplant the prevailing primordial moralities which underlaid solidarities in 
traditional societies. On the other hand, he recognised that in addition to 
associational/occupational ethics and complex division of labour, there was still a need for a 
more generalised morality, drawing from the traditional order, to hold modern societies 
together (for an extended discussion of this criticism, see Pope and Johnson 1983). Thus, the 
agonistic conception of the relationship between organic and mechanism solidarity is 
problematic.  
Colonial legacy arguments, on the other hand, place the blame for ethnicity’s 
damaging effect on the hubristic imposition of colonial boundaries, and on the cynical 
manipulation of apparent ethnic differences by colonial authorities in their quest to maintain 
control. Moreover, the ‘importedness’ of the state itself in postcolonial societies, the argument 
goes, has resulted in estranged state-society relations. Badie and Birnbaum (1983, 99) claim 
that ‘to this day the “state” is no more than an imported artifact in both Africa and Asia, a pale 
copy of utterly alien European social and political systems, a foreign body that is not only 
inefficient and a burden on society but also a fomenter of violence.’ But such arguments can 
be taken to extremes by scholars of ethnicity in postcolonial countries. Rather than being a 
starting point of an empirical examination, it ends up foreclosing close scrutiny. The 
underlying assumption is that colonialism motivated people to look inward into their ethnic 
groups, rather than outwards to the emerging state. 
But there is limited evidence for the proposition that an ‘organic’ state would be more 
acceptable to its people than an ‘imposed or imported’ one. Historically, the emergence of 
states has been marked by struggles. Theories of state formation in Europe highlight the 
formative role of (figurative) banditry (Olson 1993), coercion, and violence (Tilly 1985 likens 
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the process to organised crime). Similarly, colonialism created deep social fractures, but those 
fractures subsequently became strategic spaces for negotiations. In the history of the Gold 
Coast, there were moments of protests and agitation, and there were moments of cooperation. 
With the consolidation of colonial rule, educated elite and traditional rulers jostled for 
influence in the emerging juridical order. Commoners did not remain passive in this process 
either.  
Colonial regimes were oppressive and violent, but they often also were convenient 
weapons in ongoing social struggles among the colonised populations (Spear 2003). Many of 
the vulnerable sections of the colonial population appealed to administrators for redress 
against trammels of the traditional political order. Petitions against specific customs became 
arenas where commoners (strategically) praised the colonial regime and poured out their 
aversion for the status quo. This was the case even in the Asante Kingdom, where resistance 
to British colonial incursions was strongest and lasted the longest. For instance, a petition 
against death taxes claimed among other things that: 
Since the British Government came into existence in Ashanti, we have seen the 
 welfare of the nation, everybody getting his daily bread, and besides fine buildings 
 have been erected in Ashanti. The only thing is that in olden days whenever any body 
 died the king or chief seized the whole of the deceased’s properties, while the 
 deceased’s families were living. This brought the downfall of the Ashanti nation…9 
Commoners also appealed to colonial authorities on more mundane matters. Many of 
these have to do with extortion in the customary courts. In response to an apparent complaint 
by an aggrieved litigant, the Berekumhene received a letter of reproach from his district 
provincial administrator chiding him that: ‘[b]ecause you have power to charge up to sixteen 
pounds it is not necessary you should always do so.’10 Looking beyond the cavalier tone in 
which colonial officials addressed these traditional rulers, it can be seen that commoners felt 
they could be given protection by these officials. In response to an apparent attempt by the 
Bechemhene to force the return of a subject, a commissioner, after speaking to the woman in 
question, informed the chief that ‘she was contended and would return to Bechem when she 
wishes to do so.’11  
The same dynamic could be observed in the Gold Coast Colony proper. A woman 
requesting the dissolution of her marriage due to abuse was refused by Nene Mate Kole of 
                                                     
9 Petition Against Death Duties, reproduced in Arhin (1974, 152). 
10 Letter IX reproduced in Arhin (1971a). 
11 Letter XVIII reproduced in Arhin (Arhin 1971a). 
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Eastern Krobo, who insisted she returned to her husband. In a tone less abrupt but no less 
condescending, the commissioner wrote thus to the King: 
 Whether her statement is true or not I can not tell, one thing I know that 
nowadays people use to tell plenty lies. But in my own opinion, I think it better to beg 
to allow or to please to call Dogoro [her husband] to get his money back and free the 
woman. No any good words or threatening could persuade this woman to go back to 
Dogoro from what I have seen….  
 P.S. if the woman said you refused to listen to her, that is  not bad, it is our 
general rule to resist such women first & try to advice them to live  peaceable with 
husbands. But if we see that they are not controllable we allow them to  do what 
they choose.12 
It would appear that vulnerable sections of the population found in the presence of the 
colonial government an opportunity to rebel against aspects of the prevailing social order they 
found intolerable. The notion that the African state, because of its colonial origins, 
automatically invokes the hostility of citizens is based more on logic than on evidence. On 
this question, it would seem that academics and politicians have projected their own anxieties 
and misgivings about the state onto the general population. An emerging body of scholarship 
on the dynamics of colonialism have started to show that the widely accepted dichotomy 
between citizenship and subjecthood is simplistic and precludes serious analysis of the 
negotiations over rights and belonging (Hunter 2016a; for a famous statement of this 
dichotomy, see Mamdani 1996). Arguments like Berman’s (2010, 11; for a well-known 
statement of the dichotomy, see Mamdani 1996) that colonialism led to an erosion of trust to 
the extent that ‘[t]here was little basis for the development of impersonal systemic trust in the 
state as the impersonal arbiter of conflict or as an honest and disinterested distributor of 
public resources’ are not tenable.  
This does not mean that colonial officials necessarily went out of their way to provide 
succour to the afflicted. Commoners had comparatively more favourable attitudes towards 
colonial governments because of the opportunities they provided to escape certain constraints 
of the precolonial status quo, but preoccupied with maintaining order and control, 
administrators chose to side with traditional rulers who were more interested in the 
consolidation, or reinstating, of their own powers (Arhin 1974; Rathbone 1996; Wilks 2000). 
It is such ironies which have led scholars like Dorward (1974) to describe colonial dynamics 
as a ‘working misunderstanding’. Colonial regimes presented opportunities for social groups 
to resist some aspects of the prevailing social order, even if they might have found the 
colonial regime itself problematic in other respects. Taking a long term view of responses to 
                                                     
12 SC 17/17, COMMISSIONER to Mate Kole, 6th January 1901 
 18 
political transformations, Raufu Mustapha (1998, 222) argues that ‘[i]ndependence was 
conceived [by African peasants and commoners] as yet another “era”, comparable to previous 
“eras”: the era of this or that traditional ruler, the era of the whiteman, the era of civilian 
politicians and the era of military rulers.’ Like seasons, these eras come and go, each with its 
opportunities and constraints, and so not to be totally embraced or uncritically repudiated. 
Second, inter-ethnic tension isn’t the whole story. Recent scholarship has started 
revisiting interpretations of the precolonial past which have privileged warfare between states. 
In a recent paper, Karl Haas (2017) takes issue with interpretations of Asante-Dagbon 
relations which emphasize conquest and Asante control, showing that these ‘have been 
greatly exaggerated’ (p. 224). Indeed, there is sufficient historical evidence of inter-ethnic 
cooperation or co-existence before and during colonial rule. For instance, in his 
autobiography, Milestones in the history of the Gold Coast, Nii Kwabena Bonne (1953) 
describes himself as Mantse of Osu Alata (in Accra) and Oyokohene of Asante. That 
Kwabena Bonne could hold traditional leadership titles in both states point to the fluidity of 
notions of belonging before and during colonialism.13 Moreover, many communities 
throughout the country have historically hosted ‘stranger quarters or settlements.’ Things 
were by no means always paradisiac and this arrangement came with its inevitable tensions 
and open conflicts. But these periods of conflict punctuated long periods of harmonious 
coexistence.14 It was not uncommon for stranger quarters to be ultimately assimilated 
formally into the social and political structures of their hosts.  
Patterns of economic relations, migration, and settlement often defied attempts by 
both colonial officials and traditional rulers to define or impose rigid ethnic identities. An 
interesting case is the attempt by Paramount King of Akyem Abuakwa, Nana Sir Ofori Atta to 
define a distinctive Akyem identity. This hegemonic attempt was countered by commoners. In 
a rich account of the ensuing drama, Rathbone (1996, 518) describes the role played by the 
asafo, which…:  
…in all respects a profoundly Akan institution, was composed not only of Akyemfo 
commoners but also of Asante, Akuapems and, more strikingly, Ga and Northern 
residents of the kingdom. Accordingly it would seem fair to argue that Ofori Atta’s 
agenda, which increasingly defined a[n Akyem] citizenship based upon something 
close to ethnicity, did not go uncontested. It seems fair to conclude that Ofori Atta’s 
definition of citizenship presented his people with a heavier burden, the increasing 
obligations of being subjects, rather than expanding their access to rights. This 
                                                     
13 This was not unique to the Gold Coast. States and kingdoms have been enlarged through, for instance, 
marriage throughout history. Notions of belonging and identification have never been fixed in place. 
14 For two fascinating case studies, see Arhin (1971b) and Kobo (2010). 
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propensity allowed some unlikely bedfellows to emerge in the numerous struggles 
against the palace’s attempts to centralize power in the kingdom.  
Ethnicity is a fact of social life, a reflection of the human desire for social rootedness. 
This rootedness, whether found in ethnic, religious, or national communities, does not 
automatically express itself in automatic antagonism to other communities. In fact, as 
Lonsdale (1994, 132) argues, ‘[e]thnicity is always with us; it makes us moral – and thus 
social - beings.’ Moreover, as I have pointed out above, there was a pattern of interethnic 
relations before and during colonial rule. Thus, the notion that ethnic co-existence was 
suddenly going to be a problem in the newly independent states misrepresents the problem of 
post-colonial nation building, as was the corresponding view that the people needed to be 
tutored by their ‘bettered brethren’ who had acquired the precious gift of cosmopolitanism. 
These problematic assumptions, however, continue to inform much scholarship on ethnicity.  
CONCLUSION  
Statistical analyses reported by this paper show that contrary to prevailing theoretical 
expectations, strong ethnic identification actually predicts stronger national attachment. I 
draw on qualitative and archival data to give flesh to the skeleton of the statistical findings. I 
argue that rather than being a zero-sum game, ethnic and national identifications are actually 
manifestations of the same underlying orientation. All the forms of identification which are 
collectivistic in orientation – ethnic, African, and religious –have positive effects on national 
orientations. On the other hand, individualistic orientations – family, career, and political 
neutrality – reduce the strength of national attachment (see Table 2 below). 
 
 [Table 2 here] 
 
What does this mean, in practical terms, for contemporary problems of national unity? As 
noted in the introduction, anxieties about the negative effects of ethnicity pervade public 
discourse in Ghana and, indeed, in many other African states. In a public lecture, political 
scientist Kwame Ninsin (2008), expresses worry about how politics ‘has tended towards 
tribalism,’ warning that increasing salience of ethnic identities ‘threatens stability and peace.’  
Interethnic conflicts pose serious threats to national cohesion. At the same time, most 
local conflicts in Ghana have occurred not between but within ethnic groups. These conflicts 
have occurred over such matters as access to land or chieftaincy disputes (Tsikata and Seini 
2004). And where there have been ethnically motivated political tensions or conflicts, the 
culprits have mostly been members of the elite class. Indeed Ninsin (2006, 5) has pointed out 
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elsewhere that ‘primordial identities like ethnicity and religion have become part of the 
ideology of domination by which the political class manipulates the electorate to enhance 
their electoral fortunes’ (see also Ekeh 1975). This contradiction of the caretaker turned 
offender was captured in Achebe’s  (1984, 5) The Trouble with Nigeria: 
I was an eye-witness to that momentous occasion when Chief Obafemi Awolowo “stole” 
the leadership of Western Nigeria from Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in broad  daylight on the 
floor of the Western House of Assembly and sent the great Zik scampering back to the 
Niger “whence [he] came.” Someday when we shall have outgrown tribal politics, or 
when our children shall have done so, sober historians of the Nigerian nation will see that 
event as the abortion of a pan-Nigerian vision… 
Ninsin (2006, 2) is even harsher in his general condemnation of the political class in 
Africa. He decries their ‘iconoclastic propensities,’ and blamed them for the implosion of the 
‘institutions of self-government that the people had built during the struggle for 
independence.’ The object of Ninsin’s worry is what Lonsdale (1994) refers to as ‘political 
tribalism.’ Since ethnicity as such does not necessarily entail intergroup tensions or 
intolerance, nor indeed does it lie at the root of all conflicts in Africa, it is actually ‘political 
tribalism itself [which] always needs to be explained’ (Lonsdale 1994, 132). Even though 
some forms of ethnic tensions find social expression, these rarely achieve political salience 
unless it is capitalised on as a weapon in national struggles over resources. And since these 
struggles are wages between national elites, it is clear that they are the ones most in need of 
their own sermons on national integration which they direct to ‘the masses.’ 
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Table 1: Demographic variables 
Variable Number Percent 
Age Mean  21.6  
Range  17 - 64  
Sex  Female 498 51.2 
Male 474 48.8 
 972 100 
Marital status  Single  920 95.8 
Married  35 3.6 
Divorced  3 0.3 
Widowed  2 0.2 
 960 100 
Political 
affiliation* 
NPP 360 43.4 
NDC  96 11.6 
Neutral 332 40 
PPP 28 3.4 
CPP 6 0.6 
GFP 2 0.2 
GCPP 1 0.1 
Other 1 0.1 
Multiple parties 3 0.4 
 829 100 
* NPP (New Patriotic Party), NDC (National Democratic Congress), PPP (Progressive People’s Party), 






Table 2: Orientations and national attachment 
Individualistic orientation Collectivistic orientations 
Family  Religion  
Career (profession/studies) Ethnic group 
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Figure 3: Ethnic versus national identification   
 





Figure 4: Participation in civic acts 
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Figure 5: OLS predictions of strength of national attachment 
 






Figure 6: Attitudes to having non-ethnic or foreign neighbours 
 
 






























































Figure 7: Predicted probabilities for the dependent variable 
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